




SUPERCROSSED



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SECTION ONE

Despite our slightly different approaches to terms like 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal', approximating, with me, to a distinction between the ethereal and the corporeal in both the alpha (objective) and the omega (subjective), I revere Kant as the greatest of German philosophers, the long-term resident of Königsberg who also happens to be the German 'philosopher king'. For he understood, more than anyone else, that truth, or Truth (with a capital 'T') was independent of knowledge, as the soul, one might say, of the ego, and therefore not to be confounded with it, since they appertain to different spheres of existence or, as I prefer to say, to different axes, even if on omega as opposed to alpha terms. Kant dubbed truth the 'thing-in-itself', to differentiate it from things known by perception, which have to do with knowledge. After Kant, German philosophy split into two main strands, that of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the one a denier of the will (to representation) and the other affirming the will (to power), and that, by contrast, of Hegel and Marx, the one affirming the historical time-spirit (*Geist*) and the other a denier of spiritual historicism in the name of dialectical materialism, for which Marx claimed a scientific as opposed to mystical basis, insofar as it had to do with the role of industrial environments upon evolution and, most especially, class consciousness. If this overall evaluation is correct, then we find that a denier (of the right) is juxtaposed with an affirmer, so to speak, (of the left), and an affirmer (of the extreme right)

with a denier (of the extreme left), or something to that effect, since it would seem that the one strand had little or nothing in common with the other. No wonder, then, that western civilization 'went to the dogs' in the following century with philosophers like these, especially Nietzsche and Marx, who were surely precursors of the great fascist/communist schism which broke off from the uneasy relationship and sometimes opposition of monarchy and liberalism which had characterized the nineteenth century and was to continue into the twentieth, before both were violently assailed by their respective offshoots with the development and triumph, most especially, of Nazism and Soviet Communism.

Kant, to return to my opening admission, I revere, despite the philosophical straitjacket in which he confined a duty-bound morality, with all its utilitarian stoicism, and Schopenhauer, who denied the will as the enemy of truth and wisdom, I also greatly admire as the philosopher (if we except the Scot, David Hume) closest to Kant of those who followed in his dichotomous wake in the early nineteenth century, and this in spite of his acknowledgement of what could be termed a devolution, regressively, from the noumenal to the phenomenal, as from the Will to the – as he saw it – bodily objectification of will in the representative world, which would suggest a contrary starting-point to Kant, who, after all, affirmed the universality of soul. But Hegel I despise for reducing and effectively doing away with truth by synthesizing the abstract with the concrete and thereby dispensing with the 'thing-in-itself' of Kantian idealism if not transcendentalism, lowering what passes

for truth with him to the spirit of the age and to the historical unfolding of *Geist* (as if it progressed in an unbroken evolutionary continuity independently of ethnic or secular backslidings!), thereby unwittingly paving the way for the further degeneration of philosophical thought that was to characterize the economically-centred dialectical materialism of Marx, who effectively reduced it to the lowest-common-denominator of proletarian class struggle against the bourgeoisie within an industrial environment characterized by a presumption of capitalist exploitation. No wonder the other strand of German philosophy tended, in being closer to Kant (more noumenal than phenomenal), to take a very different stance, progressing with Schopenhauer, who detested Hegel and tried his best to compete with him for students at Berlin University, from denial of the will (and thus of Hegel's time-spirit) to its affirmation, with Nietzsche, in the interests of the *Übermensch*, whose stoical hardness towards himself or even his Self in the name of 'higher values' would seem to express a revulsion with the Marxian levelling down of historical evolution to the class struggle of the urban proletariat against their alleged oppressors. Affirmation of the will to power, especially over oneself and any inherent or perceived weakness or laziness, may not be exactly Kantian and, indeed, could be seen as very far removed from the noumenal 'thing-in-itself' that runs on separate tracks, as it were, from knowledge or, in Marx's case, the abuse of knowledge, but in an age threatened by the prospect, under Marxism, of proletarian humanism and social democracy, as by the nadir of state-hegemonic axial

criteria, you can understand why some people, fearful of the consequences for life and liberty of a proletarian take-over of society, should consider a will to oppose this of more significance, historically speaking, than a love of some hard-to-define if not indefinable noumenal truth that is not only independent of knowledge – and thus of empirical verification – but unsuited to combating any degeneration of knowledge, under the pretext of scientific objectivity, to the lowest-common-denominator of dialectical materialism and a kind of Mr Hyde-like Marxist monstrosity perversely emerging from the Hegelian Dr Jekyll, who was himself arguably too bourgeois, in his synthesizing amorality, for his own good and for any prospect, moreover, of 'fighting the good fight' on behalf of a credibly philosophical take on truth or, more correctly, *Truth* (with a capital 'T'), which towers above 'the world' as the noumenal above the phenomenal, or the metaphysical above the physical, quite apart from what degenerate philosophy, pandering to spirit and/or will, might let slip out of the bag of philosophical wisdom to assist in the establishing, as is now patently the case, of chemical and metachemical hegemonies characterized by the objective domination of female criteria and an eccentric opposition, in consequence, to both ego and soul, to knowledge and truth, from points of view closer to strength and beauty, whose political and scientific corollaries wage merciless war against economics and religion aided and abetted by pseudo-economic and pseudo-religious subordinate surrogates. And here I rest my case, but not in Schopenhauer or Hegel, still less in Nietzsche or Marx,

but as someone who sees in Kant (and to some extent Hume) a precursor of his own approach to philosophy and concept of Truth, which is for ever abstract and noumenal, or noumenally abstract, and hence metaphysical, if not capable of being known (through knowledge), then certainly capable of being *felt* or, rather, of bearing witness to that which feels the joy of soulful release, as of the freedom beyond all understanding.

Unlike facts, which are predictable, because concrete, truth is unpredictable, because abstract, and therefore one cannot be sure if it will deliver on its promise (of a better world) or even realize what it purports to represent, let alone be completely confident that what one believes to *be* true actually corresponds to *the* Truth. Consequently one tends to alternate between faith in it and doubt about it, or the likelihood of its not only *not* being what you think it is but, even if it were, of its prospects for coming to pass, since its claim to universality presupposes more than simply individual terms. With facts, on the other hand, it is less a distinction between faith and doubt than one between hope and fear, hope that the train, say, will arrive on time, or when it is due, and fear that it may be delayed and arrive late, if at all. Facts, as stated above, are concrete and therefore capable of being verified by empirical evidence, whereas truths or, rather, Truth is so abstract that it is almost a matter of opinion as to whether it is true or not, true or false, since verification of its existence depends not on concrete evidence but on feelings which, by their internal nature, are less relevant

to society in general than to the individual himself, who alone is in a position to verify the truth of what he is feeling at the time. Facts pertain to the realm of intelligence, where the mind filters sense data and interprets it to more accurate or less accurate (depending on the intelligence) representative extents. Truth, by contrast, being less collectivistic than individualistic, less outer than inner, is independent of the senses and thus of the ego, or consciousness, which utilizes them for purposes of interpretation. It is centred, one might say, in the sensibility of the brain stem and spinal cord, being a consequence of feelings which the Self, as central nervous system, has to experience, but especially in relation to itself as the agent of sentience, and such feeling can be reflected by the superego, as we may call the superconsciousness emanating from the Self, which stands to the soul, the sentient core of the spinal cord and/or central nervous system, as truth to joy or, in religious language, as God to Heaven or, as noted above in rather more physiological terms, as the brain stem (the oldest and deepest part of the brain) to the spinal cord, which is the core, or 'heart', of the Self, that is, of the higher and deeper self which, precisely because of its further removal from sense data in both its physiological (spinal cord) *and* its psychological (soulful) manifestations, should not be confounded with the ego, or egocentric self, that dwells in the brain proper as a component of consciousness, and thus of the ability of the individual to objectively evaluate and interpret sense data, not least through the eyes and ears, for purposes, fundamentally, of survival within the overall context of

society. Ego, with its once-bovaryized pleasure soul, and the Soul, with its once-bovaryized truth ego, are as distinct as physics and metaphysics, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the corporeal and the ethereal, relativity and absolutism of a subjective order, and this was grasped by Kant, who did not make the stupid mistake of confounding the one with the other, still less of reducing the Soul not so much to the realm of the ego (which, being relatively subjective, is still abstract, if to a lesser degree) as to that of the spirit after the synthesizing fashion of Hegel, who refused to allow for the distinction between the abstract and the concrete, but preferred, like any pseudo-physical 'sonofabitch', to subsume the abstract, or what passed for such with him, into the concrete, as into chemistry, thus paving the way for Marx's repudiation of even this philosophical heresy through the so-called scientific basis of dialectical materialism, which may indeed be the case, but so what? Religious idealism had long since 'bitten the dust' of Hegelian synthesizing (a process not altogether unlike the Christian concept of 'God in man', depending how you interpret the term 'God'), pretty much as a bourgeois precondition of proletarian humanism, the amoral leading inexorably to the immoral, and thus, when once the neo-autocracy of 'party vanguardism', with all its expropriating license, is taken into account, to an unfettered objectivity the legacy of which still haunts contemporary life even today. But Hegel was really so very deluded to regard the abstract simply as a function, like his time-spirit, or *Geist*, of the historical concrete. Particles of a certain type have a wavicle dimension, to

be sure, as bound psyche to free soma, whether on the 1:3 absolute basis of metachemistry or on the $1\frac{1}{2}:2\frac{1}{2}$ relative basis of chemistry, but no less assuredly do wavicles of a certain type have a particle dimension, as bound soma to free psyche, whether on the $1\frac{1}{2}:2\frac{1}{2}$ relative basis of physics or on the 1:3 absolute basis of metaphysics. What is necessary is that one should be able to categorically differentiate subatomic particles with a wavicle dimension, like photons and electrons, from subatomic wavicles with a particle dimension, like neutrons and protons, the former of which, pertaining to the female (objective) side of life, are *predominantly* concrete, while the latter of which, pertaining to its male (subjective) side, are *preponderantly* abstract. This is a distinction, in a sense, between a